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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW[4
the United States. Emphasizing the breadth of section 4, the Court
declared:
• . . Congress has . . . provided sanctions allowing private enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws by an aggrieved party. These laws protect
the victims of the forbidden practices as well as the public. . . . In the
face of such a policy this Court should not add requirements to burden
the private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth by Congress in
those laws."'
It would be unfortunate if the Radovich policy gained general appli-
cation without some thought given to its effect upon the more putative
antitrust provisions, like section 7. Predication of treble damage
recovery on the "target" test of liability, while denying literal effect to
the provisions of section 4, does effectuate the theoretically cumulative
nature of private actions." If used in conjunction with the target test,
the result in Bostitch would not inordinately promote unlimited lia-
bility, stifle business expansion, or create windfalls for persons tan-
gentially suffering losses derivative from corporate acquisition. On the
other hand, liberal implementation of the Radovich policy might work
the opposite effect. Before allowing the courts to inaugurate such a
policy, Congress should reconsider such possibilities as (1) discretion-
ary trebling of damages,"0 (2) making compensatory damages more
freely available while restricting treble damages to consummated re-
straints, or (3) restricting treble damages to intentional injuries in the
case of unconsummated restraints.
UCC-LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF FINANCING
STATEMENT REQUIREMENTS
Filing requirements under the Connecticut enactment of the Uni-
form Commercial Code1 have been construed by two recent decisions
28 352 U.S. at 453-54.
29 The purposes of the private action for damages under § 4 are (1) compensation
for injuries caused by violators of the antitrust laws, (2) prevention of violations
through fear of cumulative damages, and (3) private assistance to the government in
enforcing these laws when proof is difficult for the government acting alone to obtain.
See ATT'Y. GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 378-80 (1955); MacIntyre, The Role
of the Private Litigant in Enforcement, 7 Antitrust Bull. 113 (1962) ; Comment,
Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Development in the Treble
Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1061-2 (1952).3 0 Discretionary trebling of of damages was recommended by the Attorney General's
Committee, but the recommendation was not adopted by Congress. See ATTY'. GEN.
NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 378-80 (1955).
' UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1962 OFFIcIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS [hereinafter
cited as UCC].
Forty-three jurisdictions have enacted the Uniform Commercial Code: Ala. Acts
1965, act 549; ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.05.002-.794 (1962) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 85-1-101
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of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In
one case, a creditor duly filed a "security agreement" 2 which the debtor,
"Excel Stores, Inc.," had inadvertently signed "Excel Department
Stores." Upon debtor's adjudication as a bankrupt, creditor filed
a reclamation petition. The district court denied the petition, holding
that the security agreement was not properly signed in accordance
with Uniform Commercial Code section 9-402(1). On appeal, the
Second Circuit reversed and held: Use of "Excel Department Stores"
instead of debtor's true name, "Excel Stores, Inc.," in a security
agreement is a "minor error.., not seriously misleading," and sub-
stantially complies with the formal requisites of a financing statement,
Uniform Commercial Code section 9-402. In re Excel Stores, Inc.,
to -9-507 (1961), as amended, Ark. Acts 1961, act 185; CAL. ComERcrM.L CODE §§ 1101
-10104; Colo. Laws 1965, S.B. 104; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 42a-1-10 1 to -10-104
(1961); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28:1-101 to 10-104 (1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 671.1-101
to 680.10-107 (Supp. 1965) ; GA. CODE ANN. §8 109A-1-101 to -10-106 (1962); Hawaii
Laws 1965, S.B. 138; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, §§ 1-101 to 10-104 (Smith-Hurd 1963) ;
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 19-1-101 to -9-507 (1964); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 544.1101-.10104(Supp. 1965) ; Kan. Laws 1965, ch. 564; Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 355.1-101 -. 10-102 (1962);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1-101 to 9-507 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, §§
1-101 to 10-104 (1964); MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, §§ 1-101 to 9-507 (1963); MIc.
STAT. ANN. §§ 19.1101-.9994 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 336.1-101 to .10-105(Supp. 1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 400.1-101 -. 10-102 (U.C.C. Supp. 1963); MONT.
REv. CODES ANN. §§ 87A-1-101 to -10-103 (1964) ; NEB. REV. STAT. U.C.C. §§ 1-101 to
10-104 (1964); Nev. Laws 1965, ch. 353; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 382-A:1-101 to
9-507 (1961) ; N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 12A:1-101 to 10-106 (1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
SOA-1-101 to -9-507 (1962) ; N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 1-101 to 10-105; N.C. Laws 1965, ch. 700;
N.D. Laws 1965, cl. 296; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1301.01-1309.50 (1962); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 1-101 to 10-104 (1963); OaR. REV. STAT. §§ 71.1010-79.5070(1963) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 1-101 to 10-104 (Supp. 1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §§ 6A-1-101 to -9-507 (Supp. 1961) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1-101 to -9-507(1964); TEx. U.C.C. Art. 1-10 (Supp. 1965); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70A-1-101 to
-10-104 (Supp. 1965); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.1-101-.10-104 (1965); Wash. Laws 1965,
Ex. Sess., ch. 157; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-1-101 to -10-104 (1965) ; Wis. STAT. ANN.§§ 401.101--409.507 (1964); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1-101 to -10-105 (Supp. 1965).
2A security agreement is "an agreement which creates or provides for a security
interest." UCC § 9-105(1) (h). "Security interest" is the basic term denoting the
secured party's interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or per-
formance of an obligation, regardless of the form of security transaction employed.
UCC § 1-201(37). "Security agreement" is to replace such terms as "chattel mort-
gage," "conditional sale," "assignment of accounts receivable," "trust receipt," etc. In
Excel Stores, the security agreement was a conditional sales contract for the sale of
six cash registers, classified as "equipment" under UCC § 9-109(2).
The paper that is filed to perfect, and give notice of, a security interest is a financing
statement. The "formal requisites" of a financing statement are stated in § 9-402(1) :
"A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and the secured party,"
gives addresses of the parties, and describes the collateral by type or item. Section
9-110 provides that "any description of personal property ... is sufficient whether or
not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described." The "reasonable identi-
fication" test established in this section, and enacted by the various states without sig-
nificant modification, replaces the former "serial number" test. UCC § 9-110, comment.
A copy of the security agreement is sufficient as a financing statement if it contains
the required information and is signed by both parties. UCC § 9-402(1).
Most states have modified section 9-402 to some extent. California, Kentucky,
Maryland, and New York have considerably changed the section, generally requiring
inclusion of additional information in the financing statement.
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341 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1965). In the second case, a creditor pre-
pared a financing statement,' typing the parties' names and addresses
in appropriate spaces. Debtor signed the statement, but creditor did
not, due to a misinterpretation of the form's instructions. Both the
financing statement and the security agreement,4 the latter also lacking
creditor's signature, were duly filed. Debtor was subsequently ad-
judged bankrupt. The district court affirmed the referee's allowance
of creditor's petition for reclamation. On appeal to the Second Circuit,
affirmed. Held: Insertion of a creditor's name in the body of a financ-
ing statement, without a signature, is sufficient as a "signing" within
the meaning of Uniform Commercial Code sections 1-201(39) and
9-402. Benedict v. Lebowitz, 346 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1965).
In line with the general purposes of simplification and clarification
of commercial transactions, article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code provides a single, comprehensive system of chattel security'
under which perfection and priority of security interests may be
achieved by filing a security agreement or short-form financing state-
ment meeting only a few formal requisites.' The issue presented by
the principal cases was whether the technically deficient signatures
defeated the basic purposes of the Code's "notice filing" system.
The court in Excel Stores decided that the filing provided sufficient
public notice because the security agreement contained the debtor's
3 See note 2 supra. The financing statement employed in the principal case was State
of Connecticut Standard Form UCC-1.
4 The security agreement in this case was a chattel mortgage covering various items
of typesetting equipment.5 For a comprehensive discussion of article 9, see COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, SE-
CURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1963).
6 As under federal bankruptcy law, the term "perfected" is used to describe a
security interest in personal property which cannot be defeated in insolvency proceed-
ings or by general creditors. UCC § 9-301, comment 1. A security agreement is per-
fected when it has "attached" and when the secured party has taken whatever steps are
necessary for perfection. These steps are explained in §§ 9-302, 9-304, 9-305, and 9-306.
The requisites for attachment are stated in § 9-204. Section 9-302 states the general
rule that, to perfect a security interest, a financing statement (or security agreement)
must be filed; it also lists exceptions, most notably when the security interest is in
collateral in the secured party's possession or is a purchase money security interest in
consumer goods. Section 9-301 lists the classes of persons who take priority over an
unperfected security interest. In addition to listing other sections which state special
rules of priority in a variety of situations, § 9-312 states that priority among conflicting
security interests is generally determined in the following manner: (1) in the order
of filing if both interests are perfected by filing; (2) in the order of perfection unless
both interests are perfected by filing; (3) in the order of attachment so long as neither
interest is perfected.
The above mentioned Code sections have generally been adopted by the various
states with only minor modifications, except for § 9-302. A number of states, including
Alabama, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming have included special
language in § 9-302 dealing with security interests in motor vehicles and security agree-
ments executed by public utility and transportation companies.
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address and treasurer's signature. Underlying the court's decision
was the parties' intent to create a perfected security interest, and
the absence of any third party prejudiced by the misnomer. Because
the creditor in Benedict typed his name into the body of the financing
statement, the court found a sufficient signing under a broad con-
struction of section 1-201(39), which defines the term "signed."7 Both
opinions failed, however, to recognize certain problems which may
arise when a financing statement or security agreement is not properly
signed.
Before adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, rigid adherence
to complicated statutory formalities was required to perfect a security
interest, and even a slight technical deviation rendered perfection
ineffective.' The Code, however, is intended to reduce formalities
and pitfalls to a minimum. Its filing system requires few "formal
requisites," only "the minimum information necessary to put any
searcher on inquiry."9 In line with its intention to simplify filing
requirements, the Code states: "A financing statement substantially
complying with the requirements of... section [9-402] is effective even
though it contains minor errors which are not seriously misleading.' 0
In emphasizing substance over form, the court in Excel Stores
apparently forgot that the efficacy of all filing systems is dependent
upon detailed accuracy, especially as to names of the parties."' Under
the Code, a recorded document is indexed according to the debtor's
name.1 2 Thus, a simple misspelling could render the filing ineffective.
In many cases, filing is with the secretary of state," and any error
7 See text accompanying note 22 infra.8 E.g., In re Urban, 136 F2d 296 (7th Cir. 1943) (failure to file affidavit of good
faith) ; Petition of International Harvester Co., 9 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1925) (mere copy
of affidavit not sufficient) ; In re Holley, 25 F2d 979 (N.D. Iowa 1928) (did not prop-
erly disclose title of subscribing notary) ; Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Denison, 165 Ohio St.
89, 133 N.E.2d 329 (1956) (acknowledgment invalid because taken by telephone).
0 341 F.2d at 963.10 UCC § 9-402(5). This subsection has been enacted as quoted by every state which
has adopted the Code.
11 "Since notice filing contemplates access to the records through the medium of
names, ascertainment and use in the documents of the right names would be as impor-
tant under the Code as it is now." Shattuck, Secured Transactions (Other 7han Real
Estate Mortgages)-A Comparison of the Law in Washington, and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, Article 9, 29 WAsH. L. REv. 263, 268 (1954).
12 UCC § 9-403 (4). Most states have altered this section to some degree, allowing
a variety of indexing methods.
13UCC § 9-401 (1). This section did not attempt to resolve the controversy between
the advocates of a completely centralized filing system and those of a local system, and
was therefore drafted in a series of alternatives. A state may adopt (1) exclusive cen-
tral filing, usually with the secretary of state, (2) filing on a county, city, or town
level, or (3) both central and local filing. The state may also provide that the place of
filing depends on the type of collateral. Due to the great diversity in this area, each
state's requirements should be carefully consulted.
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would lead to confusion in the voluminous records of a central filing
system.
Corporate designations should be especially accurate, due to the
many similar corporate names which are often distinguished only
by different uses of "Inc.," "Co.," or "Corp." A file searcher should
not have to look under all possible listings of a corporation, and
then visit each address, to make certain he has the correct firm.1'
The Code fails to state what language would constitute an adequate
description of a corporate party to a contract. Connecticut corporate
law, however, requires that "corporation," "company," "incorporated,"
or any abbreviation of these, be in a corporation's name." Minor
discrepancies in a corporate designation are not considered fatal de-
fects under Connecticut law as long as "there is enough expressed
to show that there is such an artificial being and to distinguish it
from all others .... ."6 The court's finding that the misnomer in Excel
Stores was a "minor error.., not seriously misleading" is question-
able because (1) the name used, "Excel Department Stores," did
not identify the debtor as a corporation, (2) a Massachusetts cor-
poration named "Excel Enterprises, Inc." operated within the same
store building and under the same management as the debtor, and
(3) the treasurer whose signature appeared on the security agreement
was an officer of both firms.
It should have been of no consequence that the validity of a financ-
ing statement was being questioned by a trustee in bankruptcy, as
might be found from a reading of the principal case. A sufficient
financing statement or security agreement must be filed to perfect
many security interests against certain lien creditors." Under both
the Code and federal bankruptcy law, a trustee in bankruptcy is
a lien creditor from the date the petition in bankruptcy is filed."0
14 See Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Other
Recent Chattel Security Laws, Including "Notice Filing," 47 IowA L. Rnv. 289, 292-93
n. 5 (1962).
'-CONN. GENl. STAT. REV. § 33-287(a) (1961).
16 Seaboard Commercial Corp. v. Leventhal, 120 Conn. 52, 54, 178 Atl. 922, 923
(1935). A financing statement listing a corporation as debtor but signed by an indi-
vidual, the predecessor of the corporation, was held invalid in In, re Pennar Paper Co.,
2 UCC R ,. 659 (EMD. Pa. 1964) (alternative holding).
17 In re Excel Stores, Inc., 4 CCtI INsTALL. CRIT GumE 1 99406, at 89711 (D.
Conn. 1963).
18 UCC § 9-301(1) (b).
19 Lewis v. Manufacturers Natl Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961) ; Bankruptcy Act
70(c), 52 Stat. 881 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964 ed.); UCC § 9-
301(3).
It appears that the Code and Bankruptcy Act conflict as to a "lack of knowledge"
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Since a trustee is an "ideal creditor"" under the "strong-arm clause"
of the Bankruptcy Act, his claim should take preference if any third
party could have been misled by an erroneous financing statement.2
The financing statement in Benedict was not misleading, as it
accurately identified the parties and could have been properly indexed.
The only question was whether the act of the creditor in typing
his name in the body of the instrument constituted a "signing" by
him. The court based an affirmative answer on its construction of
section 1-201(39), which states that "'signed' includes any symbol
executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate
a writing.2 - The Official Comment states that the symbol "may be
printed, stamped or written; it may be by initials or by thumb-
print. It may be on any part of the document and in appropriate
cases may be found in a billhead or letterhead. 2 Under this broad
definition, therefore, any mark which identifies a party, made with
"intention to authenticate a writing," will suffice as a "signing. '24
There remains, however, the possibility that both names and signa-
tures are "formal requisites" of a financing statement. Although
section 9-402(1) uses only the word "signed," the suggested form
presented in section 9-402(3) provides places for both names and
requirement. The Code states that, unless otherwise provided, "an unperfected security
interest is subordinate to the rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor without
knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected." UCC § 9-301 (1) (b).
Thus, if a trustee himself or all the creditors represented had knowledge of the security
interest, the trustee is not a lien creditor. The federal act, however, says nothing of
knowledge. Although it would seem, under the rule of Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931),
that the Bankruptcy Act prevails over the Code, much confusion in this area prevails
in the courts. See Kennedy, The Trustee It Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code: Some Problems Suggested By Articles 2 and 9, 14 RuTGEas L. REv. 518
(1960), revised in 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, SEcURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE
UNrFORm ComrsucIAL CODE 1051 (1963) ; Note, Some Possible Areas of Conflict Be-
tween the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act, 1962 U. ILL.
L.F. 418; Symnposium-The Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Potential
Conflicts, 53 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 411 (1958).
20 See In re Waynesboro Motor Co., 60 F2d 668, 669 (S.D. Miss. 1932).
21 Cf., In re Babcock Box Co., 200 F. Supp. 80 (D. Mass. 1961). But cf., Pacific Fin.
Corp. v. Edwards, 304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962). The Bankruptcy Act's "strong-arm
clause" states:
The trustee, as to all property ... upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have
obtained a lien... at the date of bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested as of such date
with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon,
whether or not such a creditor actually exists. 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964 ed.).
22 Except for Michigan and New York, where a carbon copy of a signature is spe-
cifically valid, this subsection has been enacted by the states without change.
23 UCC § 1-201, comment 39.
24 Accord, In re Horvath, 1 UCC REP. 624 (D. Conn. 1963). A name will not
suffice as a signature in all cases. If the financing statement in Benedict had lacked the
debtor's signature, instead of the creditor's, it should have been insufficient because the
debtor's name was not typed by the debtor. See Its re Causer's Town & Country Super
Market, Inc., 4 CCH INsTAU.. CRmErr GuIDE f[ 98750 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
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signatures." Nonetheless, when section 9-402 (1) is read with the defi-
nition of "signed," the act of typing a name should suffice as a sig-
nature in a Benedict situation." In any case, both parties should be
clearly identified in a financing statement or security agreement.-
The Code states that it should be "liberally construed and applied
to promote its underlying purposes and policies." 8 Such was the court's
intention in the principal cases. It did not want to indulge in a
"fanatical and impossibly refined reading of... statutory require-
ments ... ."I The underlying purpose of filing and recording a financ-
ing statement or security agreement is to put interested parties on
notice that a named party claims a security interest in another's
property. This purpose, of course, would not be defeated by a minor
error which was not misleading. But to provide adequate notice, a
financing statement must accurately present certain basic information.
Although the drafters of the Code sought clarification and simplifica-
tion, they did not intend unlimited license. The formal requisites
in section 9-402 may be few, but they should be met; "substantial
compliance" has its limits. Liberal construction is one thing; disregard
of a simple, but essential, requirement is another. Excel Stores was
too liberal in deciding what was minor and not misleading." The test
should be, as it was in Benedict, whether public notice was effected
by the filing of an authentic and sufficient financing statement. Since
section 9-402 requires so little of a secured creditor, a court should
require stricter compliance with the few formal requisites of a financ-
ing statement.
2.5 It appears that every state enactment of § 9-402(3), (usually stating, "A form
substantially as follows is sufficienf') specifies names and signatures. California's
enactment of § 9-402(1) may have avoided this problem: "A financing statement
is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and ... secured party, gives the name... of the
debtor .... " (Emphasis added.) CAL. CoMqmcmR'.. CoDE § 9-402(1). See also MD.
ANN. CoDE art. 95B, § 9-402(6) (Supp. 1964).2 6 Contra, In re Murray, 2 UCC REP. 667 (D. Ore. 1964).
27 But see Alloway v. Stuart, 385 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. 1964), criticized in 65 COLUM. L.
RET. 922 (1965).
28 UCC § 1-102.
29 UCC § 9-402, comment 5.
30 For a better interpretation, see National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co.,
346 Mass. 255, 191 N.E2d 471 (1963). Misspelling of the name and style under which
debtor, an individual, did business, as "Cozy Kitchen" rather than "Kozy Kitchen" was
held to be a minor error. The financing statement was sufficient because the name of
the debtor, himself, was correctly given and would have been correctly indexed.
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